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The purpose of this paper is to discuss and to make certain critical 
observations on wage problems and related matters in Rhodesia and Zambia.2 
For purposes of this discussion, I  shall draw partly from my own research 
and partly from my direct experience in discussions of matters of wage rates 
and earnings, trade union wage claims, the machinery for wage determina­
tions and also wages policy.3
Labour and wage statistics providing information on wages and employ­
ment are contained in several official documents which are designed to serve 
different purposes. In Rhodesia the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959 
mentions only rates of wages in the sense of minimum rate per hour or the 
minimum average rate of renumeration per hour to be paid by an employer 
to his employees and apprentices in an undertaking, industry, trade or 
occupation.4
In Zambia the minimum wages, wages and conditions of employment 
ordinance No. 13 of 1962, as amended, is concerned only with minimum 
rates of wages to be paid to workers and learners in relation to an hour, 
day, week, month or ticket.5 Changes or movements in wage rates are reflected 
in the respective annual reports of the Department of Labour in Rhodesia
1 P ap er read  to  th e  Society  in  N ovem ber, 1967.
2  T h e  h is to rica l b ack g ro u n d  to  th e  d ev elopm en t o f w ages in  C en tra l A frica  is  to  b e  
fo u n d  in  H U M A N  P R O B L E M S  IN  C E N T R A L  A F R IC A , N o . 28, 1961, n am ely  th e  
a rtic le  o n  “W age D eterm in atio n  in  C en tra l A frica”.
3 I n  O ctober, 1962, th e  R h o d esian  In s titu te  o f  M anagem en t in  S alisbu ry  o rg an ised  a  
S tudy  C onference o n tth e  sub ject o f  IN T E G R A T E D  L A B O U R  D E V E L O P M E N T  IN  
S O U T H E R N  R H O D E S IA . A t th a t conference, w hich  w as rep resen ta tiv e  o f  th e  
D ep artm en t o f  L ab o u r, em ployers’ organ isations, trad e  un io n s a n d  in terested  persons 
fro m  th e  U n iversity  C ollege o f  R h o d esia  in  S alisbury , I  p resen ted  o n e  o f  th e  fo u r  
m a in  papers o n  w ages in  R hodesia . I n  1963 I  w as la rg e ly  responsib le  fo r  suggesting 
th e  recom m endations o n  w ages th a t  becam e in co rp o ra ted  in  th e  re p o r t o f  th e  U .N ./ 
F .A .O ./E .C .A . E conom ic C om m ission  o n  Z am b ia  o therw ise  k n ow n a s  th e  SE ER S 
R e p o r t  T h ese  recom m endations w ere  d irectly  b ased  o n  m y  field  investigations in to  
w age m atte rs  in  L usaka , N d o la  a n d  th e  C o p p erb e lt tow ns. I n  1966 I  p resen ted  evi­
dence o n  w age m a tte rs  to  th e  G o v ern m en t ap p o in ted  com m ission in to  th e  C opper 
M in ing  industry .
4  T h e  In d u s tr ia l C oncilia tion  A ct, 19S9, C h. 246, Section  71.
5 C h a p te r  190 o f  th e  L aw s o f  N o rth e rn  R hodesia . O rd inance N o. 13 o f  1962, Section
5
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and Zambia. For a fuller study of wage trends account has to be taken also 
of actual wages or earnings which include cash wages, overtime pay, all 
allowances, commissions, bonuses, employers’ contributions to pension or 
provident fund as well as the cash value of all income received in kind such 
as food rations, housing and uniforms; but in the case of African workers 
earnings include only cash wages and the value at cost to the employer of 
food rations and living premises at the place of employment. Comparable 
figures relating to earnings and average earnings of Africans and non-Africans 
are to be found in the National Accounts of Rhodesia and Zambia published 
since 1953, the Economic Surveys of Rhodesia and the Economic Reports of 
Zambia which were first published in 1964.
The Machinery for Wage Determinations
The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959, which first came into operation 
on the 1st January, 1960 in Rhodesia, provides that except for persons em­
ployed in domestic service, agricultural operations, Rhodesia Railways, and 
the Rhodesian Government, wages shall be fixed by an agreement negotiated 
between a registered trade union and a registered employers’ organisation as 
constituent members of an Industrial Council so recognised under the Act. 
Rhodesia Railways have their own wage fixing machinery based on the 
Railways Act.6
Industrial Councils operate in respect of mining, railways, building, 
printing, engineering, and the motor industry. In undertakings, industries, 
trades or occupations where there are no registered trade unions and em­
ployers organisations, or where the trade union or trade unions concerned do 
not Represent all the employees or classes of employees minimum wages are 
recommended by the Industrial boards and if the recommendation is accept­
able to the minister the recommended wages are then embodied in the 
relevant regulations. The Minister does not make Industrial Council agree­
ments or the recommended regulations by the Industrial boards binding until 
he has first made these publishable and received objections thereon. In 
agreeing to any Industrial Council wage agreement or Industrial board wage 
recommendation the Minister also has to ensure that these are not in conflict 
with or inequitable in relation to wage agreements, or determination appli­
cable to allied occupations, trq^es or industries. In this way co-ordination 
and harmonisation of various wage rates are ensured throughout the economy.
In Zambia wages are fixed or determined by negotiated agreement 
between a registered trade union and an employers organisation both of 
which operate in respect of a district, trade or industry.7 Outside the sphere
6 B y a  recen t am en d m en t o f  th e  R h o d esian  In d u s tria l C onciliation  A ct, th e  R ailw ay  
System o f W age S ettlem ent now  com es u n d e r th is A ct.
7 N o rth e rn  R hodesia  T ra d e  U n io n s an d  T ra d e  D ispu tes O rd inance, C h ap te r 25, 1963 
ed ition , an d  In d u s tria l C oncilia tion  O rd inance C h ap te r 26, 1960 edition.
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of collective bargaining wages are fixed or determined by a Wages and 
Conditions of Employment Board or a Wages Council.8 The Wages Council 
comes into being on the recommendations of the Wages and Employment 
Board. The Wages and Conditions of Employment Board or the Wages 
Council is empowered to determine the minimum rates of wages to be paid 
to workers in relation to an hour, day, week, month or ticket; the wages 
board or council also determines piece rates, the minimum rates for learners 
and the minimum overtime rates of wages as well as the extra allowance to 
be given to a worker who uses his own tools. As in Rhodesia employers are 
allowed to deduct from the minimum wage the cost of food or housing or 
both, if provided by them.
Industrial Council Agreements or Industrial Board recommended regu­
lations which the Minister adopts concerning classes of employees or a class 
of employees could, if considered advisable, differentiate or discriminate 
between such classes or members of a class on the basis of age, sex, experience, 
length of employment or type of work or type of classes of premises in which 
work is performed.9 But no method of differentiation or discrimination based 
on religion, race or colour, is allowed in any Industrial Council Agreement.10 
However, African trade unionists do not believe that in laying down wage 
rates or basic wages Industrial Council Agreements or Regulations recom­
mended by Industrial Boards ignore race or colour among workers or classes 
of employees. But the Industrial Council officials deny this allegation and 
state that basic wages are determined according to the rate for the job. It is 
true, of course, that differentiation between classes of employees usually means 
differentiation between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and that 
by and large the skilled workers are the Europeans and the unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers are the Africans. It is probably this aspect which darkens 
counsel as far as the Africans are concerned.
As opposed to the social or sociological criteria for the determination 
of wages are the economic criteria. In recommending wages in any under­
taking, industry, trade or occupation, industrial boards are specifically 
required to take into consideration such economic factors as the cost of 
living, the value of any board, rations, lodgings or other benefits supplied by 
the employers to their employees, any existing incentive scheme for the 
employees and the Ability of the employers in the industry concerned to 
carry on their business successfully if any recommendation proposed by the 
Board were approved, having regard to the cost of production and transport, 
customs tariffs, markets and any other relevant economic circumstances. The
8 N o rth e rn  R hodesia , M in im um  W ages, W ages C ouncils an d  C onditions o f  E m ploy­
m en t O rd inance, C h ap te r  190.
9 In d u stria l C oncilia tion  A ct o f  1959, C h. 246, Sections 32(2) an d  71(2).
10 Ibid., Section 71(2).
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Boards are also required to consider any representations made to them by 
their unions and or employers organisations or any matter directed to them 
by the Minister.11 No such specific economic factors are laid down in the 
industrial legislation of Zambia.
A  brief note on some of the above economic criteria is called for. Some 
trade unions in Rhodesia are so afraid of a rise in the cost of living under­
mining their standard of living that they have inserted into Industrial Council 
Agreements very elaborate scales of pay according to varying percentage 
increases in the cost of living. All this looks very ingenious and is probably 
impracticable. It might be better to determine an adequate level of wages 
from time to time according to empirical evidence based on the consumer 
price index prevailing at the time. Trade Unions pressure on wages or 
statutory minimum wages could so raise the cost of production or the cost 
of transportation of the, goods produced by certain industries as to affect 
their competitive position in the market. Again Trade Union wage pressures 
or statutory minimum wages could raise the money cost of labour above its 
real cost in such a way as to adversely affect those industries that are presently 
operating under the protection of a customs tariff.
In 1965 the number of employees in Rhodesia that were affected by 
Industrial Council Agreements on wages was 129,776 and those affected by 
non-statutory agreements was 10,858.12 13The number of employees that were 
affected by Industrial Board determined wages was 80,350 in 1965.12 
Employers are allowed to pay wages above the minimum laid down in 
Industrial Council Agreements or the determinations of Industrial Boards 
and it has been reckoned that the level of actual wages is between 12\%  and 
25% above that of basic wages.14
The Problem of Minimum Wages
According to some, if not several sociologists, the criteria to be applied 
to minimum wages is that of the Poverty Datum Line concept.15 As far as 
Rhodesia is concerned the criterion of the Poverty Datum Line was first 
suggested in the PLEWMAN Report of 1958.16 Subsequently this approach 
was extended to Zambia when Dr. D. G. Bettison published his Poverty 
Datum Line in Central Africa in 1960. The Poverty Datum Line is essentially 
a social rather than an economic approach to the determination of wages.
11 In d u s tria l C oncilia tion  A c t o f  1959, C h. 246, Section 48.
12 R e p o rt o f  th e  D ep artm en t o f  L a b o u r a n d  Social W elfare  fo r  31st D ecem ber, 1965, 
page 16, tab le  23.
13 Ibid., ta b le  24.
14 See S tudy  C o nference o n  In teg ra ted  L a b o u r in  R hodesia , 1962.
15 See P ro fesso r C lyde M itchell’s p ap er o n  th e  P o v erty  D a tu m  L ine  as p resented  to 
th e  S tudy  C o nference o n  th e  24 th  O ctober, 1962.
16 R e p o rt o f th e  U rb a n  A frican  C om m ission, 1958, pp. 347-58.
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It proceeds from an assumption that it is possible to ascertain empirically 
the lowest possible cost of supplying the elementary and fundamental necessi­
ties of life in a given society. Hence the determination of the PDL for 
Salisbury in 1945 and 1957, Lusaka 1957 and Fort Roseberry in I960.17 
The essentials of life that are generally included in the Poverty Datum Line 
are food, clothing, fuel and light, cleaning materials, transport to and from 
work, rent and taxes. It does not therefore include other requirements of 
health and decency as conceived under modern conditions. It is, of course, 
very difficult to compute the level of income which would correspond to 
the PDL, but Bettison guessed it to be about 150% of the PDL which gives 
a wage income of £22 or £23.18
In 1962 when the Study Conference met, statutory minimum monthly 
wages had been laid down by the Industrial Boards in respect of 20 under­
takings, trades or occupations. Of these, seven had wages of less than £9 
per month, six less than £10 per month, six others less than £11 per month 
and only one, namely the motor industry had a minimum monthly wage of 
slightly more than £14.19 All these minimum wages were exclusive of the 
20s to 30s allowance for accommodation.20 Even allowing for the steady 
upward movement of wages which took place between 1962 and 1966 only 
two occupations or trades had a statutory minimum wage of £14 per month 
while four others were very near that level.21 The general level of minimum 
wages was still unsatisfactory. The Minister of Labour in 1962 was very 
sympathetic to the concept of the Poverty Datum Line and he hoped that 
by gradual stages is would in time be possible to bring the level of minimum 
wages more or less into conformity with the Poverty Datum Line.
African Trade Unions have readily seized upon the concept of the 
Poverty Datum Line to press for the immediate adoption of a general mini­
mum wage in conformity with this concept. In 1962 African Trade Union 
leaders pleaded for an all round minimum wage of £20 to £25 a month.22 
In 1963 Trade Union leaders in Zambia pressed for a general minimum wage 
of £22 a month.23 In 1967 African Trade Union leaders in Rhodesia staked 
a claim for a general minimum wage of £35 a month mainly on the grounds
17 Ibid.
18 See P ro fesso r M itcheft’s p ap e r m en tioned  above.
19 See R e p o rt o f  th e  S ecre tary  fo r  L a b o u r a n d  S ocial W elfare , 31st D ecem ber, 1962, 
T ab le  21, pp. 41.
20 Ibid.
21 See R e p o rt o f  th e  S ecretary  fo r  L a b o u r a n d  S ocial W elfare , D ecem ber, 1966, T ab le  
22, pp. 16-17.
22 See M r. M . W . M ag ad za’s p ap er o n  w ages a t  th e  1962 S tudy  C o nference o n  In te ­
g ra ted  L a b o u r D evelopm en t in  S o u th ern  R hodesia , pages 23-25, O ctober, 1962.
23 See W orkers V oice, V ol. 3, N o . 3, M arch , 1963, P age 6.
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of the rising cost of living. The Minister of Labour has recently rejected 
this claim, on the grounds that it could lead to unemployment among 
unskilled workers.24 This is an understandable fear at a time of acute African 
unemployment.
Legal minimum wages are intended to prevent the exploitation of labour 
and the payment of low wages, i.e. wages which are insufficient to cover the 
minimum requirements of the worker and his family. Such minimum wages, 
therefore, represent an advance over the earlier wages which were merely 
the “pocket money” of the worker whose family support was expected to 
come from the produce of the land and stock. Minimum wage determinations 
are reviewed once every 18 to 24 months in Rhodesia. There is nothing 
fixed about minimum wages which can always be determined according to 
the changing conceptions of the satisfactory standards of health and decency 
and the changing circumstances of each trade, occupation or industry. For 
this reason the Government statement of objectives, that there should be 
an ‘adequate minimum wage level for each industry’ is very welcome.25
Economists do not seem to be in agreement about the practical effects 
and the theoretical aspects of minimum wages.26 Those who fear that mini­
mum wages might have bad employment effects seem to be much concerned 
with the effects of substantial wage increases even among workers at the 
bottom of the industrial ladder.27 The matter would seem to be different 
where moderate and gradual increases of minimum wage levels are made. 
Statutory or legal minimum wages have several advantages. They prevent 
unfair competition for labour among employers; they help to improve the 
living conditions of thousands of workers who are living below the bread­
line; they have the incentive effect of stimulating greater production and 
demand for goods and services within an economy.28 They are an essential 
part of the national armoury against poverty.
There are several employers, however, who want to put the ‘cart before 
the horse’ by insisting on the workers rise in productivity before granting a 
rise in minimum wages.29 But it is generally recognised now that where the 
majority of the workers are still living below the breadline, so to say, 
raising their wage incomes and plane of living has to precede a rise in their
24 R h o d esia  H e ra ld , 12th A p ril , '4968.
25 N a tio n a l D evelopm en t P lan  1965, C h. 1, pp. 5.
26 See W . F . J . S teenkam p, In  Q uest o f  A im s a n d  N o rm s fo r  M in im um  W age F ix ing  
in  T erm s o f th e  W age A ct—S.A . Journal o f  E conom ics, V ol. 31, N o. 4, 1963.
27 Ibid.
28 See: L. B. K a tzen ’s a rtic le  o n  “T h e  C ase  A g ain st M in im um  W age L egislation  in 
S. A frica”. S.A . Journal o f  E conom ics, V ol. 29, N o . 3, S ep tem ber, 1961.
29 See: W . J. d e  V illier’s  a rtic le  o n  “T h e  K ey  to  N a tiv e  W age Increases” in  Optim a, 
D ecem ber, 1962, pp . 202-207.
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productivity, i.e., average output per man hour. Moreover, the matter of 
raising the productivity of the worker is not the sole or even main responsi­
bility of the worker himself as it is that of management. Once the workers 
have adequate incomes to meet the costs of food, clothes, house rent, trans­
port, and other needs of modern living, improvements in productivity can 
be undertaken. Improved productivity then becomes the means and the 
opportunity for raising wages to higher levels.30
The Rate for the Job
In recent years, the policy of improving African wages towards a gradual 
approach to the Poverty Datum Line has been discarded in favour of the 
principle of the rate for the job as the proper or correct guiding policy for 
wages. Other criteria of wages such as the cost of living, the worker’s skill, 
experience and efficiency are, of course, to be applied. The principle of the 
rate for the job has always been strongly supported by Trade Unionists. 
For instance, Mr. Howard Bloomfield, President of the Trade Union Congress 
of Rhodesia, has recently defended the rate for the job as the best guarantee 
for the maintenance of artisan standards of workmanship and remuneration.31 
This was also the standpoint of the European Mineworkers Union in Zambia 
until 1964 when it ceased to exist. Even in South Africa the President of 
the Trade Union Council of South Africa has pleaded for the application of 
the principle of the rate for the job to African workers as well.32 The Depart­
ment of Labour in Rhodesia has affirmed that the rate for the job applies 
irrespective of race or colour and that there are already a few African work­
men who are qualified artisans and are paid on the same artisan rates of 
j  pay as Europeans.33
The principle of the rate for the job sounds fine when it is enunciated. 
It has the attraction of appearing to open the door to African advancement 
in skills and of matching pay or remuneration to those skills. It is therefore 
a principle that could enable the African to climb the industrial ladder. But 
the practical application of the principle of the rate for the job presents 
certain difficulties and problems. There is first of all the lack of training 
facilities for African trade learners, hostel accommodation and the reluctance
------------------------------ *---------------------------------------------------------- -^----------
30 Ibid.
31 See Rhodesia Herald, 18th October, 1967.
32 Rand Daily Mail, 10th October, 1967.
33 Two African welders employed by a Salisbury firm for 12 years now earn £22 a 
week. Six Africans employed by a Rhodesian tin mine as miners and shiftmen are 
earning £60 to £90 a month; they are the only African mineworkers earning such 
high wages at present. They work for a basic rate of 48/- for an 8 hour shift. In the 
Rhodesian Building Workers’ Trade Union there are four Africans who earn more 
than £70 per month; their minimum wage is 10/- an hour. A Salisbury Transport 
Company has one African mechanic earning 9/- an hour.
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of many white employers to take on African apprentice trainees.34 And yet 
apprenticeship facilities are a vital need of young Africans. Secondly, in 
cases where trained Africans and Europeans compete for the same jobs at 
the same rates of pay, the employers preference goes to the Europeans because 
they believe that only European workmanship produces good results.35 Thus 
the practical effects of the application of the principle of the rate for the job 
has been to exclude the Africans from skilled jobs and better rates of re­
muneration. In the final result, skilled jobs become mainly the preserve of 
European artisans. Further, it will also be remembered that for several years 
in Zambia the European Mine Workers Union effectively blocked the scheme 
for African advancement by insisting on the rate for the job and the closed 
shop policy. The European miners and artisans were using the principle of 
the rate for the job to defend the dilution of their labour and the threat to 
their established rates of pay and standard of living by a class of workers of 
lower skills and insufficient industrial background. The African workers seek 
to get the same rate of pay for the same job which the white employee is 
doing now or has been doing. In short, for the African the rate for the job 
is simply the European rate. However, African Trade Unions are not very 
enthusiastic about the rate for the job principle because they see it as a 
weapon of the exclusion of their members. For management the rate for the 
job has come to mean a rate determined in accordance to job evaluation and 
job content. A workman of any race who satisfies or meets these requirements 
gets the appropriate rate of pay. This is the way forward.
Problems of Wage Structure
Problems of wage structure fall into two categories:— (1) the wage 
structure of a single industry or occupation and (2) the national wage struc- 
ture.*The problem of the wage structure of a single industry or occupation is 
concerned with the factors that determine the remuneration of labourers, staff 
and management. These factors explain the differences in pay between the 
different categories of employees within a single industry or undertaking.
For the national economy as a whole there can be no uniform wage struc­
ture because every undertaking, industry, trade or occupation is different and 
therefore has its own peculiar wage structure. To some extent the differences 
in wage structure are a reflection of differences in the proportions of capital 
and labour and also differences ift the proportions of skilled, semi-skilled and
34 I t  is d o u b tfu l w h eth er th e  new ly enacted  A ppren ticesh ip  T ra in in g  and  Skilled 
D evelopm en t A c t in  R hodesia , w h ich  is no n -rac ia l in  its prov isions an d  in tentions, 
w ill overcom e these  difficulties. B u t th e  G o v ern m en t co u ld  use th is a c t to  the  
ad v an tag e  o f  a ll races.
35 In  th e  1962 S tudy  C onference  o n  In teg ra ted  L ab o u r D evelopm ent in S outhern  R h o ­
desia, th is  a ttitu d e  w as a ttrib u ted  to  th e  w idely  h e ld  b e lie f th a t even th o u g h  an  
A frican  m ay  h av e  th e  know ledge a n d  skill h e  still lacks in itiative, responsib ility  and  
in d u stria l background .
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unskilled labour used in the enterprise. But a major cause of differences in 
wage structures of various industries, undertakings or trades is differences in 
basic wages or wages rates, overtime of night shift allowance, payments in kind 
and other fringe benefits.36
In Zambia and Rhodesia there is the problem of a dual wage structure. 
The European employees have one wage structure and the Africans are on 
another structure and these two wage structures are determined by two different 
sets of consideration. To a large extent the dual wage structure, which is itself 
an aspect of the dualistic economy of the two countries, can be explained in 
terms of the differences in the supply and demand functions of European and 
African labour respectively. On the supply side there are differences due to the 
respective numbers of Europeans and Africans coming onto the labour market 
and also the fact that Europeans are better educated and trained, better housed 
and better fed than the Africans. The demand for European labour is the 
demand for skilled artisans and supervisory personnel whereas the demand for 
African labour is largely the demand for unskilled labour.
The Dual Wage Structure in the Copper Mining Industry
Problems of the dual wage structure have arisen in their sharpest form 
in the copper mining industry in Zambia, especially since that country became 
independent. This dual wage structure arose and developed in historical 
circumstances of the scarcity of skilled labour of Europeans recruited from 
Overseas and South Africa and the abundance of unskilled labour available 
locally. With the increase in the efficiency and length of service of the Africans 
in recent years the issues of African advancement and the dual wage structure 
have become inseparable..37
Before the Second World War (1939-1945) the European workers did not 
object to moderate African advances taking place. In this attitude they were 
influenced by three considerations. The jobs of the existing European labour 
force were not in jeopardy; the substitution of Africans for Europeans really 
meant separating unskilled labour tasks from skilled jobs rather than turning 
skilled tasks over to the African employees. Moreover employment was 
expanding absolutely. But after the war the European Mine Workers Union 
became opposed to African advancement and insisted on the acceptance of the 
‘closed shop’ principle by the Mining companies. The Union also insisted on 
the principle of the “rate for the job” and that there should be no job 
fragmentation. The Mining companies, on the other hand, maintained that at 
the rate for the job, as defined by the European Union, Africans were not
36 These matters of wage structures and wage differentials received much attention at 
the Rhodesian Employers Seminar, 9th and 10th November, 1967. See Background 
Papers and discussions thereon.
37 R. Baldwin, Economic Development and Export Growth, p.p. 150.
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employable in competition with Europeans.38 39Only by alloting to Africans at 
different rates of pay, the least responsible work in the European field and 
some part only of the more responsible type of work in that field, could 
Africans, in course of time, become employable at the “rate for the job” .
The Forster inquiry of 1954 found that “it was this fundamental differ­
ence between the Companies and the European Union which prevented African 
advancement”. It also recorded its view that the African in the Copper Mining 
Industry is capable of industrial advancement.
Ten years after the end of the war and fifteen years after the Scheme was 
first proposed a compromise scheme of African advancement was agreed upon 
between the Mining Companies and the European Union. About 30 employ­
ment categories in schedule A were turned over to Africans. Some of these 
jobs were identical with those hitherto performed by European workers while 
the others were fragmented jobs, that is, more than one African now performed 
a task previously undertaken by one European. In 1960 nearly 35 jobs were to 
be opened up to Africans on a man to man basis, and 20 new fragmented tasks 
or jobs were to be created. It was then estimated that 350 Europeans would be 
replaced by Africans. Thus between 1955 and 1960, 1,000 Africans, represent­
ing less than 3% of the average African labour force were advanced into new 
job positions.30
The wages that were paid to those Africans who were promoted to the 
new jobs were higher than those Africans received previously, but still much 
lower than the wages that were paid to those Europeans who had hitherto 
done these jobs. Otherwise the dual wage structure still remained in being. On 
this account and also because so very few Africans benefited the Zambia 
Minfifoorkers Union and its vast majority of members became disappointed 
with the Manning Structure that was recently introduced by the Mining 
Companies and its relevant local wage structure.
The African Unions have argued that it is wrong that there should be the 
big discrepancy between the lowest paid expatriate and the highest paid local 
employee. There seems to be no principle as to who is an expatriate other 
than that he is white, and no principle as to who is a locally employed person 
other than that he is black; the local wage structure is confusing for the 
average employee and where thfcre is confusion there is bitterness. Locally 
employed persons should get exactly the same basic rate for the job as 
expatriates.
The Mining Companies have maintained however that —
1. Local wage levels and expatriate wage levels are subject to different
38 See R ep o rt o f  th e  C om m ission  o f  In q u iry  in to  th e  M ining Industry , 1966, pp. 15-16.
39 R . B aldw in, E conom ic D evelopm ent an d  E x p o rt G ro w th , p.p. 161.
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influences. The expatriate wage levels are influenced by the world 
market position and its inevitable fluctuations; by political and other 
factors in Zambia which are weighed up by the potential recruit, 
such as exchange control regulations, cost of living, education facili­
ties, etc. Local wages are affected by cost of living, but also by such 
factors as the increase of local skills, the diversification of industry 
and the gradual development of the economy.
2. If there is one wage structure, the emoluments of locals and ex­
patriates are hitched together and an increase in local wages which 
might be justified leads to an increase in expatriate wages which, in 
terms of any factors applying to them, might not be justified. This 
could not be dealt with by reducing expatriate allowances as the 
whole system would then become suspect amongst those whose 
services need to be retained and the new man who has to be 
attracted.
3. Where anomalies have occurred, the pressure of local employees 
will be on removing them by increasing basic salaries to the higher 
level, while expatriate pressure will be for equalising the allowances, 
with the possible outcome that both are increased.
4. As potential recruits tend to make judgements on the level of the 
basic wage, the use of the local wage plus allowances would 
adversely affect recruiting.
The Brown Commission 1966
With the advent of an African National Government in Zambia the 
issues of the disparities between the expatriate and the local wage scales was 
bound to receive immediate attention. Accordingly, in 1966 the Government 
appointed a Commission of Inquiry into wages and conditions of service in 
the Copper Mining Industry. The Commission was also required to examine 
the effectiveness of the procedures for Zambianisation and industrial relations 
in the Copper Mining Industry.
As regards the problem of the disputed wage structure the arguments 
that were put forward fcy the Mining Companies, on one side, and the African 
Unions on the other could be summarised in the manner indicated hereunder:—
A — THE CASE OF THE M INING COMPANIES:40
(1) That the wage and salary rates and the conditions of service of employees 
in the mining industry on local terms are good by any standards applicable 
at this stage of development in the Republic of Zambia.
40 R ep o rt o f  th e  C om m ission  o f In q u iry  in to  C o p p er M ining, pp.33-37.
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(2) That all conditions of service for local employees which admit of negotia­
tion have been properly negotiated in the letter and spirit of recognition 
agreements and in accordance with good industrial relations principles.
(3) The disparity between expatriate and local wage scales is still justifiable 
in the present circumstances of the Mining Industry and the need to 
recruit expatriate labour. Steps have already been taken to bring the 
two wage scales closer together.
(4) The wages paid to the Africans in the Copper Mining Industry compare 
favourably with the wages paid by other employers in Zambia and 
adjacent territories. For example, the minimum monthly wage in the 
Copper Mines for unskilled workers is £22.7.6d. as compared with the 
statutory minimum wage of £10.8.0d. per month outside the Industry. 
Semi-skilled workers are also better paid and the minimum rate in the 
Copper Mines is between 70% and 115% above the minimum paid by 
some employers outside the Industry.
(5) Wages since 1956 have risen faster than either the amount of copper 
produced per head, or the cost of living.
(6) The Mining companies also quoted with much approval the findings of the 
SEERS Report in 1963/64 that “there has been a fast upward trend in 
wages. The average wages of Africans in mining, more than doubled 
between 1954 and 1964, when they rose from £132 to £289 per annum. 
Big wage increases averaging 7% or 8% per year would make the 
economic development programme of the Government or the country 
virtually impossible.
B— THE f iA S E  OF THE AFRIC AN UNIONS.«
The African Unions submitted that:—
(1) The Wage structure in the industry has been designed to perpetuate 
European superiority.
(2) With the dual wage structure an African is debarred from competing in 
ability and performance with his European colleagues, who seems to 
belong to a different category of supervisors, even though he may be only 
on probationary employment. As f  result there are no Europeans, recruits 
or otherwise, who receive orders from Zambians.
(3) The disparity in wages and other conditions of employment bears no 
relation to economic factors. It is based on colour.
(4) In addition to his basic salary the expatriate also gets a better house, 
better leave, more sick pay and educational allowances for his children. 41
41 R ep o rt o f  th e  C om m ission o f  In q u iry  in to  th e  M ining Industry , 1966, pp. 38-39.
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All these differences are unnecessary and the African worker has reason 
to think he is being exploited. This leads to frustration, loss of interest 
in the job and proneness to accidents, all of which affect production.
Having made the above criticisms of the existing mining companies 
wages policy the African Unions then claimed that:—
(1) Expatriate basic wages are the proper rate for the job.
(2) There will never be peace and harmony in the industry until local 
employees are paid the same basic wage as expatriates doing the same 
work.
(3) The present wage structure in the industry makes it most unlikely that the 
slogan “One Zambian—One Nation” will ever be put into effect.
(4) There seems to be no principle as to who is an expatriate other than that 
he is white, and no principle as to who is a locally employed person other 
than that he is black.
It became clear that the Mining Companies were basing their whole case 
on wage statistics and the repercussions of increased wages on the Zambian 
economy or National interest while the African Unions were concerned with 
redressing racial differences, economic justice and achieving sectional advan­
tages for their members.
THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION.
The Brown Commission came to the conclusion that the wage structure 
(expatriate wage and salary scales and local wage scales) is unacceptable to 
African employees mainly because of their belief that this wage structure 
represents a return to distinctions and differences based on race and colour. 
The Commission accordingly rejected expatriate and local wages scales and 
recommended the creation of a single basic wage scale for all employees in the 
Industry,
The Commission then recommended that the new settlement between 
the Mining Companies and the African Unions should be based on the follow­
ing principles:—
0
(1) The principle of the rate for the job must be recognised by the creation 
of a single basic scale of wages on which all employees, local and 
expatriate, are placed in an appropriate position determined on the basis 
of job evaluation.
(2) The level of wages on the single basic scale should be determined with 
due regard to two factors:
(a) The value in Zambia of skills and experience which can now be 
acquired by Africans as well as Europeans.
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(b) The basic realities of the economy and the need for Zambia to 
achieve balanced development.
(3) Allowances paid to expatriates should be the minimum necessary to attract 
or retain them until they can be replaced by Zambians. In all cases, both 
in amount and form of payment, they should be subject to approval by 
Government.
(4) The cost to the mining companies of work performed by an African 
should not be less than the cost when the same, or substantially similar 
work is performed by a European.
On the immediate wage dispute under consideration the Commission 
recommended that a general wage increase of 22% should be granted immedia­
tely to all employees a t present on local terms of employment. It believed that 
though such an increase might otherwise be regarded as excessive in terms of 
the growth rate of the Zambian economy this was necessary to secure industrial 
peace in a key industry and to correct the anomalies of the existing expatriate 
and local rates of pay.42
Wages Policy in Zambia
At the time of the formulation of the Seers Report I was asked to suggest 
a Wages policy that would be consistent with the requirements of the pro­
gramme of economic development for Zambia. It seemed advisable to recom­
mend that in addition to the existing machinery for wage determination by 
collective bargaining and statutory bodies there should be created a National 
Wages Council whose task would be to consider wage claims and to study 
the trendj of wages and earnings in relation to the Government’s economic 
policy and to advise on them to the appropriate Ministry of Government. 
Even though such a body might be considered by some people as an inter­
ference with the operation of the factors of demand and supply in the labour 
market overseas, experience seemed to indicate that it might serve a very useful 
purpose.
While favouring a policy of wage restraint for Zambia in order not to 
allow rising wage costs to jeopardise the National programme of economic 
development, it seemed desirable to^allow voluntary increases of wages by 
employers in recognition of long service or greater efficiency by their employees. 
It also seemed justifiable to say that further wage increases or wage claims 
should be justified either by a rise in the cost of living as measured by the 
current Consumer Prices Index or a rise in productivity as measured by output 
per worker or per man hour worked. This is the kind of approach to wage
42 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Copper Mining Industry, 1966, 
paragraphs 114-117. These paragraphs indicate how the Commission arrived at the 
figure of 22%.
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increases that employers generally insist upon or approve of. In practice, how­
ever, it is very difficult for wage increases or earnings to be matched exactly to 
the rise in productivity as British experience from 1946 to 1956 serves to show. 
During that period national production rose by 3% a year, production per 
man rose about 2\% , but average earnings rose about 7% and total wages 
and salaries rose 8% a year.
The policy of raising money wages to reflect fully productivity increases 
in firms or industries has been seriously questioned. First, productivity advances 
are very unequal among firms and industries. Second, productivity gains usually 
result primarily from improvements in technology, although improvements in 
both worker and managerial performance play an important part. Third, it is 
frequently difficult to measure productivity charges in a firm or industry, 
especially over short periods. Fourth, if productivity increases were converted 
fully into wage increases, the incentive to invest would be seriously weakened. 
Fifth, productivity may fluctuate from time to time or the volume of output 
and other factors change.
In the course of my cross examination by the Mining Companies during 
the sittings of the Brown Commission, the leading representative of the 
Mining Companies referred, with obvious approval, to a statement in Arthur 
Lewis’ latest book on economic development to the effect that economists 
have usually expected that wage rates in the modern sector should be about 
50% above the income of peasants in the subsistence sector.43 It was then 
stated that African wages in the copper mines were more than above this level, 
even about twice the level of wages in commerce and industry.441 subsequently 
discovered that the mining company representatives had overlooked the 
statements appearing in the same page to the effect that in practice urban 
wages could not be kept to the 50% level above subsistence earnings. Arthur 
Lewis gives three reasons why this is so. Firstly, there is the upward pressure 
on wages by Trade Unions. Secondly, progressive employers (e.g. the Copper 
Mining Companies themselves) like to make voluntary wage increases in order 
to maintain the goodwill or morale of their workers and to share their profits 
with them. Thirdly, National Governments that have taken office on a popular 
vote are very much inclined to support the claims of workers against foreign 
capitalists.45 Arthur Lgwis also refers to the upsetting effects on wages and 
employment of the rise of a profitable industry which is capable of paying 
high wages and setting the pace for wage increases elsewhere.46 This is exactly 
what has happened in Zambia.
43 W . A . Lewis, D evelopm en t P lann ing : T h e  essentials o f  E conom ic Policy, pp.77-78. 
L o ndon , 1966.
44  £22 7s. 6d. w as th en  th e  m in im um  m o n th ly  w age in  th e  C o p p e r M ining In d u s try  fo r  
unsk illed  w orkers aga inst £10 8s. Od. in  com m erce a n d  o th e r industries.
45 W . A . Lewis, pp. 78.
46 Ibid.
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An American Economist of high repute has written a book in which he 
criticises the wages policy that has been adopted in the Copper Mining 
Industry in Zambia up to 1960. His criticism is based firstly on the argument 
that wages in the Industry have as a result of monopoly pressures been raised 
higher than they would be under free market competition, that is, under 
ordinary conditions of supply and demand for the different categories of 
labour. He therefore regards the wage levels which prevailed up to 1960 as 
being artificially high, to use his own words:
“One wonders, however, whether the model of a free market for labour 
and wages is realistic in a situation where both workers and employers are 
organised and where the Industry concerned is oligopolistic.”
His second ground of criticism is that the high level of wages in the 
Copper Mining Industry have acted as a magnet to work seekers from the 
subsistence sector and elsewhere who, however, cannot all be absorbed into 
employment at the prevailing wages. Hence these high wages have largely led 
to great unemployment. But this is so only in part. In part, unemployment 
is due to lack of industrial development outside the copper belt and also to 
insufficiently developed agriculture. The third criticism is that the high wages 
in this key industry have retarded the development of the secondary industries 
since these industries cannot produce at the wage level of the mining industry.
If secondary industries and other mining enterprises were obliged to pay 
wages obtaining in the Copper Mines they would not produce or survive. 
Secondary industries have nevertheless come into being in response to such 
factors as suitable location, transport facilities, market attraction, production
costs and availability of suitable labour.I
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It has been stated by one well known authority that developing countries 
do not have serious problems of wages and labour like the advanced countries 
of Western Europe and North America. Whereas the advanced countries are 
confronted with a situation of a high level of employment and labour shortages, 
inflationary pressures and general increases of wages induced by widespread 
collective bargaining and the influence of strong trade unions, no such situation 
exists in the developing countries.47* The argument is that in the developing 
countries a high level of employment does not yet obtain and there is still a 
considerable surplus of labour mainly from the rural areas; the money and 
exchange sector is still relatively small compared to the traditional or sub­
sistence sector and so the wage earning population is still relatively small in 
relation to the total population; though trade unions have come into existence
47 H . A . T u rn e r: W age T rends, W age Policies an d  C ollective  B argain ing : T h e  Prob lem s 
o f  U nderdeveloped  C ountries, O ccasional P ap er, N o . 6. U n iv ers ity  o f  C am bridge, 
D ep artm en t o f  A pp lied  Econom ics.
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they are not yet strong in numbers, funds and executive personnel and in fact 
the African trade union movement especially in Rhodesia would seem to be 
showing fissiparous tendencies; most wages are the result of statutory 
determinations rather than collective bargaining which applies only to a few 
key industries.
The above-mentioned features of the developing countries present only 
part of the total picture. While quantitatively speaking only a minority of 
Africans are committed wage earners, totally dependant on wage employment, 
a considerable number of persons from the traditional sector draw some of 
their income from wages or spend part of their lives as wage earners.48. It has 
already been observed that in several parts of the former Federation of Rho­
desia and Nyasaland from 60 to 75% of the male population goes away from 
their home villages to work on commercial farms or takes work for some 
time in the towns or mines.4'-' Wage earning activities therefore affect a larger 
number than those who can be described as a true industrial African prole­
tariat. The upward trend of wages in African countries has been noticeable 
since the 1950’s and the average annual rate of increase in African wages 
appears to have been about 7 or 8%.60 This same average rate of wage in­
creases was found in Zambia in 1962/63. ’1 Since then wage inflationary pres­
sures have exerted themselves so that wages and salaries in Zambia have risen 
by about 22% in 1966. ’-’ In Rhodesia and Zambia there has developed a 
serious shortage of skilled labour and in the copper mining industry and the 
lead and zinc mines in Zambia and in the skilled trades in Rhodesia trade 
unions exert a strong enough influence on wages. In the two countries under 
consideration there is a noticeable upward trend of prices.
It would appear then that as the developing countries become more 
advanced in their economies and social and political organisation, and further, 
that as Government development expenditures are increased, these countries 
will begin to show the same tendencies in wages, prices, labour shortages, 
trade union pressures as obtain in the more advanced countries though not to 
the same extent or intensity.
*
48 Methods and Principles of Wage Regulation, page 9, being Report III of the Second 
African Regional Conference, Addis Ababa, 1964.
49 Northern Rhodesia, Report of the Rural Economic Development Working Party, 
page 3. Government Printer, Lusaka, 1960.
50 H. A. Turner, page 12.
51 See the U.N./F.A.O./E.C.A. Economic Commission Report on Zambia, 1963-64,
pp. 122.
52 Budget Statement of the Zambian Finance Minister.
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